Abstract
Introduction
A long standing trend in high performance distributed systems is the increase of the number of nodes. As a consequence, the probability of failures in supercomputers and distributed systems also increases. So fault tolerance becomes a key property of parallel applications. Designing and implementing fault-tolerant software is a complex task. Fault-tolerance is a strong property which implies a theoretical proof of the underlying protocols. The protocol implementation should then be checked with respect to the specification.
In order to validate this implementation, a rigorous testing approach can be used. Automatic failure injection is a general technique suitable for evaluating the effectiveness and robustness of distributed applications against various and complex failure scenarios.
After having validated the fault-tolerant implementation, it is necessary to evaluate and tune its performance, in order to determine the best protocol suitable for an actual distributed system. Fault-Tolerant distributed applications are classically evaluated without failures. However, performance under a failure-prone environment is also a important information for evaluating and tuning a fault-tolerant distributed system. Automatic failure injection is desirable to evaluate fairly different heuristics or parameters under the same failure conditions.
In this paper, we present FAIL-MPI, a software that can be used both for software fault-injection and for stress testing of distributed applications, which are the basis for dependability benchmarking in distributed computing. As a case study for complex fault-tolerant system, we strain the MPICH-Vcl non-blocking implementation of the ChandyLamport protocol. MPICH-Vcl is a high performance faulttolerant MPI library which provides a generic framework to add transparently fault-tolerance to any MPI application.
FAIL-FCI: a fault-injection tool

Previous works
The issues for testing component-based distributed systems have already been described, and the methodology for testing components and systems has already been proposed. [15] presents a thorough survey of the available tools. However, testing for fault-tolerance remains a challenging issue. Indeed, in production systems, the fault-recovery code is rarely executed in the test-bed as faults rarely get triggered. As the ability of a system to perform well in the presence of faults depends on the correctness of the fault-recovery code, it is mandatory to actually stress this code. Testing based on fault-injection can be used to test for fault-tolerance by injecting faults into a system under test and observing its behavior. The most obvious point is that simple tests (e.g. every few minutes or so, a randomly chosen machine crashes) should be simple to write and deploy. On the other hand, it should be possible to inject faults for very specific cases (e.g. in a particular global state of the application), even if it requires a better understanding of the tested application. Also, decoupling the fault-injection platform from the tested application is a desirable property, as different groups can concentrate on different aspects of fault-tolerance. Decoupling requires that no source code modification of the tested application should be necessary to inject faults. This also increases the reliability of the test, since the code tested is the actual implementation that will be run in a production environment. Finally, to properly evaluate a distributed application in the context of faults, the impact of the faultinjection platform should be kept low, even if the number of machines is high. Of course, the impact is doomed to increase with the complexity of the fault scenario. For example, when every action of every processor is likely to trigger a fault action, injecting those faults will induce an overhead that is certainly not negligible. The table below captures the major differences between the main solutions for distributed fault injection relatively to the aforementioned criteria. 
FAIL-FCI
We now describe briefly the FAIL-FCI framework that is fully presented in [8] . First, FAIL (for FAult-Injection Language) is a language that allows one to easily describe fault scenarios. Second, FCI (for FAIL Cluster Implementation) is a distributed fault-injection platform whose input language for describing fault scenarios is FAIL. A scenario describes, using a high-level abstract language, state machines which model fault occurrences. The FAIL language also describes the association between these state machines and a computer (or a group of computers) in the network.
The FCI platform is composed of several building blocks:
The FCI compiler: The fault scenarios written in FAIL are compiled by the FCI compiler which generates C++ source files and default configuration files.
The FCI library:
The files generated by the FCI compiler are bundled with the FCI library into several archives, and then distributed across the network to the target machines according to the user-defined configuration files. Both the FCI compiler-generated files and the FCI library files are provided as source code archives, to enable support for heterogeneous clusters.
The FCI daemon: The source files that have been distributed to the target machines are then extracted and compiled to generate specific executable files for every computer in the system. Those executables are referred to as the FCI daemons. When the experiment begins, the distributed application to be tested is executed through the FCI daemon installed on every computer, to allow its instrumentation and its handling according to the fault scenario.
MPICH-V: Fault Tolerant MPI
MPI (Message Passing Interface) is a standard for programming parallel applications using message passing systems. Thanks to its high availability on parallel machines from low cost clusters to clusters of vector multiprocessors, it allows the same code to run on different architectures. It also allows the same code to run on different generations of machines, ensuring a long life time for the code. Moreover, MPI conforms to popular high performance, message passing, programming styles. Even if many applications follow the SPMD programming paradigm, MPI is often used for Master-Worker execution, where MPI nodes play different roles. For these reasons, MPI is the most widely used programming environment for high performance applications. MPI in its specification [13] and most deployed implementations (e.g. MPICH [6] ) follows the fail stop semantic (specification and implementations do not provide mechanisms for fault detection and recovery). Thus, MPI applications running on a large cluster may be stopped at any time during their execution due to an unpredictable failure.
The need for fault-tolerant MPI implementations has recently reactivated the research in this domain. Several research projects are investigating fault-tolerance at different levels: network [12] , system [2] , applications [5] . Different strategies have been proposed to implement fault-tolerance in MPI: a) user/programmer detection and management, b) pseudo automatic, guided by the programmer and c) fully automatic/transparent. For the last category, several protocols have been discussed in the literature. As a consequence, for the user and system administrator, there is a choice not only among a variety of approaches for faulttolerance but also among various fault-tolerance protocols.
Choosing the best fault-tolerance protocol depends highly on the number of components, the communication scheme for the parallel application, and the system behavior with respect to failures. In this work, we strain the ChandyLamport implementation of the MPICH-V project [7] with high failure rates, in order to define its fault-tolerance capabilities.
The Chandy-Lamport algorithm [4] proposes to implement fault-tolerance through a coherent snapshot / rollback recovery protocol. During the execution, components can trigger checkpoint waves, which build a coherent view of the distributed application. Each process saves its image on a reliable media when entering the coherent view. When a process is subject to failure, the distributed application is interrupted, computing resources are allocated to replace the failed processes, and all processes rollbacks, that is all processes load their last checkpoint image that is member of a complete coherent view. Since the view builds a possible distributed configuration of the application, the execution of the application can continue from this point on, according to the original specification, as if failures did not occur.
The MPICH-V [7] project aims at comparing the performance of different fault-tolerance protocols in the MPI implementation MPICH-1 [6] . One of the protocols implemented is the non-blocking Chandy-Lamport algorithm with optimizations. There are two possible implementations of the Chandy-Lamport algorithm: blocking or nonblocking. The blocking implementation uses markers to flush the communication channels and freezes the communications during a checkpoint wave. On the contrary, the non-blocking implementation let the application continue during a checkpoint wave and store the messages emitted before a wave marker in the checkpoint image. We describe more thoroughly the protocol and its implementation below, but notice that a MPI process is implemented by two separate components in order to store in-transit messsages. These two components run in separate unix processes, namely a computation process (MPI) and a communication process (daemon). The communication process is used to store in-transit messages and to replay these messages when a restart is performed. The protocol works as shown in Figure 1 . The MPI process 1 initially receives the marker from the checkpoint scheduler (1), stores its local state (2) and sends a marker to every process (2) . From this point, every message (denoted by m in the figure) received after the local checkpoint but before receiving the marker of the sender, is stored by the daemon process. When the MPI process 0 receives the marker, it starts its local checkpoint and sends a marker to every other process (3) . The reception of this marker by process 1 marks the completion of its local checkpoint. If a failure occurs, all processes restart from their most recent checkpoint (4) , and the daemon process replays the delivery of the stored messages (5) . Note that the message m may be not sent again in the new execution.
MPICH implements a full MPI library from a channel. Such a channel implements the basic communication routines for a specific hardware or for a new communication protocols. MPICH-V is a generic framework to compare different fault-tolerance protocols for MPI applications. This framework implements a channel for the MPICH 1.2.7 library, based on the ch p4 default channel.
MPICH-V is composed of a set of runtime components and a channel called ch v. This channel relies on a separation between the MPI application and the actual communication system. Communication daemons (Vdaemon) provide all communication routines between the different components involved in MPICH-V. The fault-tolerance is performed by implementing hooks in relevant communication routines. This set of hooks is called a V-protocol. The V-protocol of interest for this paper is Vcl, which is a non-blocking implementation of the Chandy-Lamport algorithm.
Daemon A daemon manages communications between nodes, namely sending, receiving, reordering and establishing connections. It opens one TCP socket per MPI process and one per server type (the dispatcher and a checkpoint server for the Vcl implementation). It is implemented as a mono-threaded process that multiplexes communications through select calls. To limit the number of system calls, all communications are packed using iovec techniques. The communication with the local MPI process is done using blocking send and receive on a Unix socket.
Dispatcher
The dispatcher is responsible for starting the MPI application. It starts the different processes and servers first, then MPI processes, using ssh to launch remote processes. The dispatcher is also responsible for detecting failures and restarting nodes. A failure is assumed after any unexpected socket closure.
Failure detection relies on the Operating System TCP keep-alive parameters. Typical Linux configurations define a failure detection as 9 consecutive losses of keep-alive probes, where keep-alive probes are expected every 75 seconds. These parameters can be changed to provide more reactivity to hard system crashes. In this work, we emulated failures by killing the task, not the operating system, so failure detection was triggered by the reset of a connection, which was broken as soon as the task was killed by the operating system.
Checkpoint server and checkpoint mechanism
The two implementations use the same abstract checkpointing mechanism. This mechanism provides a unified API to address three system-level task checkpointing libraries, namely Condor Standalone Checkpointing Library [11] , libckpt [16] and the Berkeley Linux Checkpoint/Restart [9, 12] . All these libraries allow its user to take a unix process image in order to store it on a disk and to restart this process on the same architecture. By default, BLCR, which is the most up-to-date library, is used. The checkpoint servers are responsible for collecting local checkpoints of all MPI processes. When a MPI process starts a checkpoint, it duplicates its state by calling the fork system call. The forked process calls the checkpoint library to create the checkpoint file while the initial MPI process can continue the computation. The daemon associated with the MPI process connects to the checkpoint server and transmits through a producer/consumer algorithm the checkpoint file generated by the child process. When the checkpoint file has been completely sent, the child of the MPI process terminates and the daemon then sends every message to be logged according to the Chandy and Lamport algorithm that has been temporarily stored in the volatile memory of the daemon. Using this technique, the whole computation is never interrupted during a checkpoint phase.
When a global checkpoint is complete it is not necessary to continue storing the past global checkpoints. Thus, checkpoint servers only store one complete global checkpoint at a time keeping at most two checkpoint images per computing node.
If a failure occurs, all MPI processes restart from the local checkpoint stored on the disk if it exists; otherwise they obtain it from the checkpoint server.
Checkpoint Scheduler
The checkpoint scheduler manages the different checkpoint waves. It regularly sends markers to every MPI process. The checkpoint frequency is a parameter defined by the user. It then waits for an acknowledgment of the end of the checkpoint from every MPI process before asserting the end of the global checkpoint to the checkpoint servers. The checkpoint scheduler starts a new checkpoint wave only after the end of the previous one.
FAIL-MPI: merging self-deploying tools
The previously available FAIL-FCI fault-injection platform [8] made several assumptions about the distributed application that do not fit the self-deploying MPICH-V. Specifically, it was assumed that a ssh-like mechanism was systematically used to launch a process in the distributed application and that processes do not stop executing except unless failures are injected. Then, the FAIL-FCI middleware was able to control the launch, suspend, resume, and stop actions by using GDB with a command-line interface. As MPICH-V is also a middleware that self-deploys itself on many nodes, it was not possible to deploy MPICH-V inside FAIL-FCI.
To circumvent this problem, we developed a new integration scheme for fault-injection that can be used for any self-deploying distributed application: FAIL-MPI (see Figure 3) . The major difference between FAIL-FCI and FAIL-MPI is that the former does not require any change on the application under test, while the latter provides an interface for a self-deploying application, that must be used to support fault-injection. Not using this interface means that the self-deploying application will suffer no faults, while using the interface triggers the use of the fault scenario that was designed, as in the FAIL-FCI middleware. The basic scheme is as follows. Instead of simply launching a new process by running a command-line argument, the selfdeploying application registers itself with a FAIL-MPI daemon. Of course, the FAIL-MPI daemon is expected to be already running on the machine. It is possible to automate this scheme so that the change in the source code is almost transparent, for example, by having the command-line argument replaced by a script that effectively makes the call to the FAIL-MPI daemon. Then, the FAIL-MPI daemon manages the application specified by the command-line through a debugger to inject fault actions.
Another new feature of FAIL-MPI is the ability to attach to a process that is already running, so that processes that were not created from a command-line argument (such as those obtained by fork system calls) can also be used in the FAIL-MPI framework. This requires simply to register with the FAIL-MPI daemon using the process identifier as an argument, so that it can attach to the running process.
By using these two extensions, it is possible that the application under test is not launched by the FAIL-MPI middleware (e.g. this happens in peer-to-peer systems or desktop grids, where new users are expected to join the system on a regular basis), yet a fault scenario would typically need to perform action when new processes join or leave the system. One obvious reason for this is that we should inject faults only on processes that are actually running. Moreover, one could be interested in what happens when a process crashes and another process joins simultaneously. As a result of the above observation, we integrated three new FAIL triggers (i.e. model for system events) in the FAIL language: 
Performance Evaluation
In this section, we strain the MPICH-Vcl implementation with many patterns of failures and analyze the observed performance. For all measurements, we used the NAS parallel BT (Block Tridiagonal) benchmark [1] class B varying number of nodes. This benchmark provides complex communication schemes and is suitable for testing faulttolerance. The class B ensures a medium-sized memory footprint and is suitable for measurements in a reasonable time.
We ran the measurements on Grid Explorer, a component of the Grid5000 platform. Grid5000 is an experimental platform dedicated to computer science for the study of grid algorithms, and partly founded by the French incentive action "ACI Grid". Grid5000 as of today consists of 13 clusters located in 9 French cities with 40 to 450 processors each, with a total of 1928 processors. Grid Explorer is a major component of the Grid5000 platform. It is located at Orsay and consists in 216 "IBM eServer 325" computers. All computers are dual-processors AMD Opterons running at 2.0 GHz with 2 GB of RAM, and each computer has a 80 GB IDE hard drive and a GigaEthernet network interface card. A major feature of the Grid5000 project is the ability for the user to deploy its own environment (including operating system kernel and distribution) over all nodes that are dedicated to the experiment. We deployed a Linux operating system, version 2.6.13-5, including the BLCR module version 0.4.2 for checkpointing. We compiled the benchmarks with g77 from the FSF version 4.1.0 and the usual optimization options (-O3).
To implement the various failure scenarios, we used a centralized approach. We designed a specific FAIL-MPI daemon using the FAIL language to coordinate failure injection while the other FAIL-MPI daemons control the execution of MPI computing nodes. The specific FAIL-MPI daemon is denoted as "P1" in the rest of the paper. For all measurements, P1 chooses a process subject to failure according to the failure scenario, and sends a failure order to the controlling FAIL-MPI daemon. When a daemon re- ceives a failure order, either a MPI node is actually running on it, or not. If there is such a MPI node, the failure is injected and P1 receives an acknowledgement; if there is no MPI node, P1 receives a negative acknowledgement and may choose another node to inject the failure. Formally, the FAIL scenario used for controlling every MPI computation node is given in Figure 4 . Each FAIL-MPI daemon has two states; in state 1, it awaits for the onload event to go to state 2. If a crash order is received (line 2), it sends the negative acknowledgement and remains in state 1. In state 2, if the MPI node exits or is subject to an error, it goes back in state 1 to wait for a new MPI node to register. When receiving a crash order (line 6), it sends the acknowledgement, halts the process and goes back to state 1.
Some of the experiments introduce too much stress into the application and the fault-tolerant library is not able to tolerate that level of stress. Then, the application either freezes or enters a cycle of rollback / crash. If the application cycles between rollback and crashes, this denotes a level of failure too high for having any progression of the computation. If the application freezes, this denotes a bug in the implementation (as would an execution terminating before the finalization). For detecting both cases, we introduced a timeout on all our experiments. After 1500 seconds, every component of the application (including checkpoint servers, scheduler and dispatcher) is killed and the experiment is marked as non-terminating.
In every experiment, we distinguish between experiments that do not progress anymore due to the high failure frequency (when the failure frequency is too high, the application has no time to reach the next checkpoint wave before being hurt by a new failure, so it cannot progress and appears to stall) and experiments that do not progress due to a bug in the fault-tolerant implementation. The difference between the two kinds of experiments is done by analysing the execution trace. In the following figures, we present the non-progressing execution percentages with a black bar and the buggy execution percentages with a grey bar. Figure 5 presents the impact of fault frequency on the performances of the BT class B benchmark for 49 processes. 53 machines were devoted to this run, ensuring that enough spare processors were found in every scenario.
Impact of faults frequency
The scenario, presented in Figure 5 (a), injects failures at a given rate. The algorithm for the daemon P1 is as follows. A process is first randomly (and uniformly) chosen (line 1), then a timeout is programmed (line 2). Upon expiration of the timeout (line 3), the failure injection order is sent to the chosen process. If an acknowledgement is received, a new process is randomly chosen and the cycle continues (line 5). If a negative acknowledgement is received (denoting that no MPI process is running on the same node as the chosen process, which can happen because of previous failure injections), another process is immediately chosen (line 4) and a failure injection order is sent to the new process (line 6), until an acknowledgement is eventually received.
The performance measurements are presented in Figure 5(b) . The dashed line represents the total execution time of the benchmark as a function of the frequency of faults; the percentage of non-terminating experiments according to the same parameter is represented using black bars and the percentage of bugging experiments is presented using grey bars. Every experiment was run 6 times and the value presented here is the average value of the measures.
As the scenario describes it, no overlapping faults were intended in this experiment, and we can see that there are no buggy executions. At some point, the time be- Figure 6 . Impact of scale tween two faults is less than the time between two checkpoints, and when this happens, the application does not have enough time to progress. Non-terminating executions appear, and progress with the frequency of failures, up to a point where almost no execution terminates. Similarly, the rollback/recovery algorithm takes an increasing part of the total execution when the number of faults per minute increases, and we can see with the solid line that the execution time progresses with the number of faults per minute. This is partly contradicted by the measurement for one failure every 45s. More thorough analysis of the experiment traces demonstrated that for this frequency of failures, failures occur just after checkpoint waves (this is due to the checkpoint wave frequency set at one checkpoint wave every 30s). When failures occur just after a checkpoint wave, the rollback/recovery mechanism is the most efficient. Figure 6 presents the impact of the scale on the performance of the BT class B benchmark for a given frequency of fault-injection. In this experiment, one fault was injected every 50 seconds and the number of nodes running the application varies from 25 to 64 (BT needs a natural square number of nodes). The FAIL scenario is the same as the one used in the previous experiment (see Figure 5(a) ). Each experiment was run 5 times and the average value is presented here.
Impact of scale
At 25 nodes, one of the five experiments was nonterminating. All experiments are run with the same number of checkpoint servers. Since BT uses an approximately constant memory fingerprint divided equally between the computing nodes, at 25 nodes, the size of each checkpoint image is greater than at 36 or more nodes. So each checkpoint image transferred individually takes more time at 25 nodes than at the other sizes. This implies that the checkpoint and recovery times are longer for 25 nodes than the other sizes, and for one of the experiments, the checkpoint waves were synchronized (per chance) with the failure injection (every 50s). So there was no longer any progression. When the checkpoint image size decreases and the checkpoint and recovery times also decrease, this phenomenon appears with lower probability.
The total execution time measured for the experiments with a failure injected every 50s at different sizes is apparently chaotic. It can be very close to the time measured without failure (at 64 nodes) or up to 2.5 times slower. In fact, a precise analysis of the measurements demonstrates that the variance for these measurements increases with the number of nodes, and the average value presented here is not meaningful. Failure injection at regular time period regardless of the protocol, and failures injected just before a checkpoint wave have a major impact on the overall performance, however failures injected just after a checkpoint wave have a negligible impact.
In order to accurately measure the effect of varying this parameter, the number of experiments to run needs to be higher. Another solution is to precisely measure the date of failure injection as compared to the date of the last checkpoint wave, and measure the impact of this delay on the total execution time. However, this also requires the ability to read the variables of the program strained, which is a planned feature of FAIL-MPI, but is not yet implemented. Figure 7 presents the impact on the performance of the BT class B benchmark for 49 processes, where simultaneous faults appears every 50 seconds. This measurement is a stress test for the fault-tolerant MPI implementation with the rare case of simultaneous faults. The fault-injection scenario is formally given in Figure 7 (a) and Figure 7 (b) presents the percentage of buggy experiments and the average total execution time for 6 experiments.
Impact of simultaneous faults
The scenario is a simple variation of the previous one. At timeout expiration, not one, but X (X being the abscissa of the figure) processes are chosen, one after the other, to crash. Every time the master enters the node 1, it uniformly selects a process (line 2), then at timer expiration (line 4) it sends the crash order to the selected process and enters the node 2. Every time the process enters node 2, it select another process (line 5). In node 2, if it receives the positive acknowledgement and there are still faults to inject (line 6), it sends the crash order to the selected process, decrements the number of faults to inject and enters the node 2 again. If a negative acknowledgement is received (line 8), another process is selected by re-entering the node 2. When all failures have been injected successfully (line 7), the number of failures to inject next time is reset to X and P1 enters the One can see that at 5 or 6 simultaneous fault-injections every 50s, one third of the experiments had a buggy behavior. A complete analysis of the execution trace demonstrated that all of them were frozen during the recovery phase after a fault-injection. This phenomenon does not appear spontaneously with less simultaneous faults, and a majority of the executions were not subject to this behavior, even with multiple checkpoint phases and recovery phases (a checkpoint wave every 30s, so an average number of checkpoint waves between 6 and 7, and a failure injection every 50s, so approximately 4 faults and recovery per execution).
Bug hunting using FAIL-MPI In order to locate precisely the bug in MPICH-Vcl with FAIL-MPI, we conducted a set of experiments targeting more precisely this behavior. Since the execution trace suggested that the bug occurs at recovery time, we first designed a scenario to inject failures during this time. The scenario we used is formally given in Figure 8(a) .
Due to the complexity of the scenario, we modified the generic scenario used for the computing nodes. They now have to count the number of restart waves, and send a waveok message to the controlling process (P1) to synchronize failure injection. Roughly speaking, the algorithm for the daemon P1 is nearly the same as the one used for the fault frequency experiments. Lines 1 to 6 are used to ensure that the first fault is really injected, since we devoted more machines than needed to the experiment, in order to have spare nodes, a participating node may not be executing any MPI daemon, and the positive acknowledgement must be checked to ensure that a failure is indeed injected. Then, the P1 daemon waits for a message from a FAIL-MPI daemon running on a computing node which denotes the beginning of a recovery wave, and sends to it a crash order (line 7). After sending this order it goes in an empty state (node 4) and do not inject any other faults during the execution.
The performance measurements are presented in Figure 7(b) . We note that even if we injected only 2 faults using this scenario, at any scale, some experiments did not terminate due to a bug in the fault-tolerant implementation. This demonstrates that the bug is located in this part of the execution and is not a consequence of the size of the application. However, a large majority of the executions is not subject to the bug, so we have to define more precisely the conditions for failure injection. At this step, we suspected that the recovery bug happens only if a process is subject to failure while it is in a recovery wave, some of the other processes have not finished terminating their execution because of the failure detection, and the MPICH-Vcl dispatcher detects the failure of the process in the new wave. It seems that if this happens, it becomes confused between which processes are in which state and which should be restarted.
In order to demonstrate this, we conceived the last scenario presented in Figure 9 . In this experiment, we wanted to run the same scenario that was used in the previous experiment but using the state of the MPI daemon to determine the time at which the second fault is injected. Because we need to ensure that the MPICH-Vcl dispatcher is confused with the state of the process in the recovery wave, we need to inject the failure after the connection is established and some of the initial communications are done. So, the second fault is injected just before the MPI communication daemon calls the function localMPI_setCommand. This function is called by the communication daemon after it has exchanged the initial arguments with the dispatcher, and this ensures that the dispatcher sees this daemon as running, so it will trigger the failure detection mechanism when the failure occurs. The specific FAIL-MPI daemon (P1) used to coordinate the failure injection is described in Figure 9 (a). The only modification with the previous scenario is that while in the node 4, process P1 sends nocrash orders, so that the computing processes will not be blocked when entering the localMPI_setCommand function. The node 4 has been modified, because after sending a crash order to the first daemon which detected an execution of a MPI daemon from the recovery wave, the daemon P1 must still wait for the message from every other daemon of the second wave to send them the order to continue their execution (line 8). Then, only the process receiving the crash order will inject the failure just before entering Function localMPI_setCommand.
The corresponding measurements are presented in Figure 9(b) . In every case, every experiment froze during the recovery wave. So, we conclude that the bug in the recovery process illustrated by the simultaneous failure injection appears when the dispatcher detects a failure of a process already recovered, while there are still other processes in the previous execution wave that did not received the termination order.
Conclusion
In this paper, we use the FAIL-MPI automatic faultinjection tool to strain the MPICH-Vcl non-blocking implementation of the Chandy-Lamport protocol. We present the tool derived from the previously available FAIL-FCI faultinjection tool, and evaluate the fault-tolerance properties of MPICH-Vcl through many experiments using the NAS BT benchmark in the MPICH-Vcl framework.
FAIL-MPI is the first version of FAIL that allows the application under test to dynamically launch and stop processes during the execution. For this purpose, we added specific new events to the FAIL language (namely spawning of a process, exit or interruption). Using this tool, we were able to reproduce automatically previous measurements that were done manually, like the impact of fault frequency on the execution time [10] . This provides the opportunity for evaluating many different implementations at large scales and compare them fairly under the same failure scenarios.
The execution time measurements demonstrated a high variability depending on the time elapsed between the last checkpoint wave and the fault-injection. In order to provide lower variance in the results, the FAIL language and FAIL-MPI tool should be able to read and modify internal variables of the stressed application: this is a planned feature.
The last experiments of the paper demonstrate the high expressivity of FAIL-MPI to precisely locate a rare bug in the dispatcher of MPICH-Vcl. We were able to demonstrate that if a second failure hits a process already recovered after it registered with the dispatcher, and other processes are still being stopped by the first failure detection, then the dispatcher is confused about the state of each process and forgets to launch at least one computing node. This bug is now corrected in the MPICH-Vcl framework and was discovered during this work.
FAIL-MPI is a valuable tool for detecting and isolating bugs, and for evaluating the performance of a complex faulttolerant distributed system under precise failure conditions.
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